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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New York State has the potential to cultivate 
52% of its current electric needs from wind 
power.  However, harnessing the State’s rich wind 
resources is only possible if strong renewable 
energy policies are in place.  This thesis explores 
New York’s energy policies through the experience 
of wind developers working in the state.  It uses 
information obtained through interviews with wind 
developers to argue that New York’s centralized 
regulatory framework for siting and connecting 
electric facilities and purchasing of renewable 
energy attributes may not be ideal for attracting 
wind development.  It concludes that in order for 
New York to realize its wind potential the state 
must extend and expand its Renewable Portfolio 
Standard and introduce greater flexibility into its 
regulatory framework. Without taking these steps 
to foster a political and economic environment 
favorable to the wind industry, wind development 
in the state will stagnate. 
INTRODUCTION
Energy sustainability is one of the most pressing 
challenges of our time.  Our reliance on fossil 
fuels as a primary energy source is unsustainable 
and has many negative externalities.  Emissions 
from the burning of fossil fuels are causing 
extensive environmental degradation, and global 
climate change.  In the United States, reliance on 
foreign countries for fossil fuel supplies plays a 
central role in US foreign policy; and domestically 
natural gas and coal production have ravaged our 
natural environment.   In order to reorient our 
policies towards US environmental quality and 
public health, cultivate political relationships that 
are not driven by energy production and mitigate 
climate change we must focus our efforts on the 
production of clean energy.  
In 2011 the electric sector accounted for 40% 
(39.3 quadrillon Btus) of energy consumption in 
the United States. 46% of that consumption was 
derived from coal, 21% from nuclear, 20% from 
natural gas and 13% from renewables (wind, 
solar, biogas and hydroelectric).1  Despite the 
environmental, political and economic benefits of 
renewable energy, predicted growth in this sector 
is low.  The US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) anticipates that coal and natural gas will 
make up 67% of total electricity generation in 
2035, while renewables will account for only 15%. 
1 In order to ensure that the US at least hits this 
prediction, if not surpasses it, strong renewable 
energy policies must be in place.
Figure 1.1 Energy Production by Source 2010, 2020, 
2035 (billion kilowatt hours)1
The greatest leaps in the development of new 
renewable electricity capacity in the U.S. have 
been in wind development.  Net electricity 
generation from wind grew 291% between 2004 
and 2008, and wind is the country’s second largest 
source of renewable energy in (outmatched 
only by hydroelectric power).2   Wind is also the 
primary source of renewable energy in New York 
State.   The amount of installed wind capacity 
from 0 to 1,638MW between 2000-2012 in New 
York and wind power currently accounts for 2.1% 
of electricity consumption.3  This growth suggests 
that the New York has created a favorable 
environment for wind development. However, New 
York has barely tapped into its wind reserves.  The 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory calculates 
New York’s wind resources to be 25,781 MW and 
estimates that New York could provide 52% of its 
current electricity needs with wind power. 4  This 
potential could result in an abundance of low-
cost electricity for New York residents, but only if 
New York supports wind development with strong 
renewable energy policies.
Wind farms (in contrast to individual wind 
turbines) enable states to grow their renewable 
energy capacity quickly.  However, wind farms are 
large, industrial projects that require thorough 
environmental review for siting and safety.  As key 
players in development and land use decisions, it 
falls within the realm of planners to facilitate the 
siting of wind farms and cultivate an environment 
open to the deployment of renewable energy. 
In order to create this environment it is critical 
to understand the needs of the private sector 
to ensure that policy and regulation enable 
industry growth.  Thus, this thesis investigates the 
perspective of wind developers in New York State 
to inform future renewable energy discussions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many theories and “best practices” 
for overcoming barriers to renewable energy 
deployment and incentivizing the use of 
renewables.  Each strategy addresses a different 
challenge, and some can provide solutions to 
multiple challenges.  As part of the initial research 
for this thesis literature regarding many of the 
broad ideas deemed “solutions” to the renewable 
energy challenge were reviewed.
However, a working knowledge of the electricity 
industry in the United States, its history and the 
electric grid is necessary for a valid discussion 
of any renewable generation additions to 
the system.  This background is helpful for 
understanding the perspective of policy makers 
and grid regulators when deciding if and how 
renewable generation plants can be connected 
to the existing electrical network. An awareness 
of electricity pricing is helpful for understanding 
the economics of renewable energy development. 
This section discusses the history of the United 

































Figure 1.2 Electricity Net Generation by Renewable Source in the United States 2004-2008 5
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components of the grid and the changing role of 
utilities and electricity producers. In this context 
it reviews common renewable energy challenges 
and popular solutions.
DEREGULATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
GENERATION
In the traditional energy system there are 
three components to electricity: generation, 
transmission and distribution.  These three 
processes are controlled by a single utility that 
is either investor-owned and state regulated, or 
owned by a local municipality.  New generation 
facilities are built and operated by utilities.  The 
costs of construction are approved by public 
service commissions and passed on to ratepayers. 
In the United States, the 1978 Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) unbundled these 
services to allow new energy providers to enter 
the market and reduce the United State’s reliance 
on foreign energy sources.  PURPA forced electric 
utilities to purchase electricity from “qualifying 
facilities (independently owned electric generation 
facilities),” at the “avoided cost” of building a 
new generation plant and producing the power 
themselves.6   As a result, many public utility 
companies signed long term Power Purchasing 
Agreements (PPAs) to purchase electricity from 
nuclear energy providers and other independent 
power providers (IPPs).  This was the first step to 
creating a free-market electricity system.  
Although PURPA intended to lower costs for 
ratepayers, many PURPA contracts ended up 
costing ratepayers more.  When the cost of 
natural gas and other fuel sources dropped in 
the 1980s utilities with nuclear PPAs were locked 
into contracts with high prices.  The contrast in 
electricity prices between states with uneconomic 
PURPA contracts and those that had resisted 
signing contracts fueled further demand for 
restructuring of the electric industry. 7 
The federal government responded in 1992 with 
the National Energy Policy Act.  The act enabled 
power generators to compete for the sale of 
electricity to utilities instead of receiving “avoided 
cost payments.”  Then, in 1996, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) passed Order 888, 
which required utilities to open their transmission 
lines to competitors. 8   As a result many states 
began to consider further deregulation of 
electricity markets to increase competition and 
lower electricity prices.   California was the first 
to deregulate its wholesale electricity market in 
1996, since then 24 more states have experimented 
with electricity restructuring.  Electricity price 
deregulation is still heavily debated and some 
states have abandoned deregulation.  These 
states abandoned their deregulated policies 
because prices did not drop as expected and price 
volatility increased. 9
Today there are separate companies that generate 
electricity (Independent Power Producers), 
transmit the electricity (Transmission Companies 
or TRANSCOs) and distribute the electricity 
(Utilities) but in some states (like New York) the 
utilities own both the local distribution grid and 
the transmission lines.   In most deregulated states 
customers have the option to purchase electricity 
from Energy Supply Companies (ESCOs) or, if they 
do not sign contracts with ESCOs their utility will 
purchase electricity for them.
It is harder to secure financing to build electric 
generation facilities in deregulated markets. 
In regulated markets, where utilities finance, 
build and recuperate costs through rate cases 
with public service commissions the cost of 
construction is distributed amongst all ratepayers. 
In deregulated markets generators must find 
independent financing for construction, and build 
their “return on investment” case around profits 
from energy sales, payments for ancillary services 
and capacity added to the electric network. 11
Electricity producers sell electricity to the 
wholesale market virtually at operating cost. 
This means that facilities with low operating 
costs provide cheaper electricity than facilities 
with higher operating costs.  Higher operating 
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Figure 2.2 Typical Electricity Dispatch Curve  12
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costs are typically derived from the cost of fuel 
necessary to create the electricity (e.g. the price 
of coal or natural gas).  Because most renewable 
electricity does not require fuel, the operating 
cost of renewable energy facilities is low.  
In the electricity market different generators 
are turned on at different times of day to meet 
demand.  Low-cost sources will be used first and 
more expensive systems will be turned as demand 
rises.  As more expensive sources are turned on, 
every less expensive source gets paid the selling 
price of the most expensive source being used. 
This price curve is shown in Figure 2.2.  The 
opportunity for renewables to make a profit lies 
in the gap between the cost of operation and the 
higher price point of fuel-reliant technologies.  
In a deregulated market electricity prices are 
volatile and unpredictable.  The selling point of 
natural gas and coal facilities will rise and fall 
depending on the cost of fuel.  This price volatility 
makes it difficult for renewable energy developers 
to calculate how much profit they will generate 
from selling electricity.  If fossil fuels are cheap 
wind technologies have a lower profit margin. 
That means recuperating development costs from 
selling electricity alone is difficult.  
Policymakers have recognized the need to provide 
additional financial support to help renewable 
energy developers offset the large capital costs 
of development. The most widespread financial 
benefits for renewable energy in the U.S. are the 
Renewable Energy Credit trading system and the 
Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC).  The federal 
government implemented the Production Tax 
Credit in 1992 under that year’s Energy Policy 
Act.  The program provides a 2.2cent tax credit 
on every kWh utility-scale turbines produce for 10 
years. 13   The PTC has been influential in growing 
wind capacity across the country, but congress 
has allowed the program to expire multiple times 
creating uncertainties in the wind market.  The 
influence of the PTC on wind development can be 
seen in figure 2.3.  



































































In addition to the PTC, wind developers can 
recuperate their investment through the selling 
of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).  RECs 
are used to prove consumption of renewable 
electricity because tracking actual consumption 
of the electrons produced of renewable sources 
is impossible.  Typically, one REC is generated per 
kWh of renewable electricity produced.  RECs can 
be sold in compliance (mandatory) markets, or on 
the voluntary market and prices vary widely, but 
voluntary market prices are usually much lower 
than compliance market prices.
In order to create a demand market for renewable 
energy and RECs, most states will implement 
a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  A RPS 
sets targets for how much of the state’s energy 
should be generated by renewable sources by a 
certain year.   This strategy mandates that electric 
utility companies “supply a specified minimum 
amount of customer load with electricity from 
eligible renewable energy sources.” 15  To date 29 
states, Washington D.C. and two territories have 
RPSs, eight states and two territories also have 
Renewable Portfolio goals. 16   
The utility company can met this goal in several 
ways; it can own and operate a renewable 
generation plant itself, it can purchase Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECs) from another electricity 
provider, or it can purchase the REC and the 
electricity from a renewable energy producer 
(often called a “bundled renewable energy 
certificate”).  Typically RPSs apply to investor-
owned utility companies only because municipally 
owned utilities and cooperatives are usually self-
regulated.  
RPSs can differ in state requirements for qualifying 
energy sources, diversification specifications, 
hard v. soft targets and the inclusion of penalties 
for non-compliance.  Diversification mandates 
require certain amounts of electricity to come 
from different sources to avoid overreliance on 
any one energy source.  States may also have one 
large mandate (e.g. 30% by 2015) without hard 
targets, or the large mandate can be broken into 
yearly targets to help achieve the larger goal (e.g. 
1% increase each year until target goal is reached 
in the final year of the RPS).  Some RPSs also have 
“alternative compliance payments” (ACPs) where 
utilities can opt to pay a fine for not meeting the 
state’s mandate.  ACPs are usually more expensive 
than the price renewable energy credits utilities 
purchase to prove compliance with the RPS.
To create a successful RPS a state must consider 
many specifications.  It is important to identify 
early on what types of energies qualify, whether 
it applies on to new plants or also to preexisting 
ones, what geographic areas are included and 
whether RECs are bundled or unbundled. 18 
The policy should be flexible in its early stages 
if renewable energy plants are not abundant 
in the state.  Requiring too much energy from 
renewables when there is not a large supply 
leaves utilities vulnerable to price surges in the 
REC market. These higher prices are passed on 
to the ratepayers and can generate hostility to 
the renewable market.  Legislatures must also 
balance requirements for renewable purchasing 
with mechanisms to make renewable energy 
economically feasible for developers. 
Most RPSs anticipate that a majority of the 
renewable electricity generated to meet the 
standard will come from utility-scale plants. 
19   However, there are many barriers to building 
a new large-scale renewable generation plant, 
especially for small-medium size IPPs.  Large-


















































Figure 2.4 States wi h Renewable Portfolio S andards (m ndatory) or Goals (voluntary) as of January 2012 17
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scale plants are capital-intensive and the siting 
and permitting process is challenging.  There is 
also a strong “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) factor 
from local residents. RECs help offset the costs of 
development and create incentives for engaging 
in this trying process. 20   
RPSs have a strong influence on REC prices.  The 
most common RPS factors affecting REC prices 
are the size and strictness of the state’s RPS goal 
and the supply of renewable energy in that state. 
21   The price of RECs is a strong determinant in 
where developers will go because states with 
higher REC prices offer more profit opportunity to 
renewable energy developers.  
Policy considerations arise with RECs over how 
they should be priced, how long the REC payments 
should last and whether they should be sold in 
a market system or through contracts.  Contract 
payments offer the greatest amount of certainty 
for developers because they can calculate how 
long it will take for them to make a return on their 
investment.  Although, free market REC trading 
offers greater potential for developers to profit 
from high REC prices, particularly if utilities are 
able to purchase RECs separately from electricity 
and from out of state generators.  On the other 
hand, if a state has a particularly demanding RPS 
that forces utilities to purchase very expensive 
RECs that cost is put on ratepayers and diminishes 
the benefits of renewable energy to the state.
Although not used in the U.S., an alternative to 
the RPS-REC system is a feed-in tariff (FIT).  In a 
feed-in tariff system renewable energy is sold at 
a premium to utilities and the cost is distributed 
to all end users for a fixed number of years 
(usually 20).  The tariff amount is based on the 
real generation cost plus a small premium.  The 
premium provides a return that is significant 
enough to spur investment in renewable 
technologies but not high enough for excessive 
profits.  The return can then be reinvested into 
the company in order to expand production and 
reach economies of scale.  This model has been 
particularly successful in Germany, where the 
tariff system holds the rank of law.  The tariff 
varies depending on the size of the system and 
the burden of payment is distributed among all 
electricity consumers. The cost of grid connection 
is the responsibility of the installation operator so 
that plants can be located where natural resources 
are the strongest, and not interconnection 
benefits. 22  This model is a combination of 
the U.S.’s regulated and deregulated markets- 
where development costs are spread amongst 
consumers but generation ownership is separated 
from distribution.  However, the adversity most 
Americans feel towards higher taxation makes 
the use of an FIT improbable in the United States.
THE GRID
In order for a renewable energy generator to 
supply electricity to end users, the facility must be 
connected to the grid.  The U.S. electric grid is has 
grown and developed significantly over the past 
century.  Initially generation plants were small and 
near to the communities that they served because 
a lot of energy was lost during transmission. 
As transmission technology grew stronger, it 
was possible to create larger generation plants 
that wheeled electricity to communities across 
state boundaries. 23   This qualified as interstate 
commerce and required federal regulation.  In 
1938 the Federal Power Commission (now known 
as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) 
was given the authority to regulate the sale 
and transportation of electricity.  Today the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
negotiates the financial aspects of interstate grid 
maintenance. 
The current US grid is nationally integrated 
and more efficient than in the past, but it still 
loses an average of 7% of its electricity during 
transmission. 24  The majority of electricity is sold 
over longer distances on the wholesale market, 
but these longer transmission lines pose threats 
to grid reliability.  Larger transmission lines have 
lower transmission capacity and should operate 
under capacity to reduce the risk of power outages. 
However, most transmission lines are old and must 
operate at near full capacity to satisfy demand.25 
With electricity demand expected to grow 22% 
between 2010 and 2035, 26 new transmission lines 
are needed to prevent congestion and maintain 
grid reliability.  
Federal and state governments recognize the 
need to upgrade the transmission grid. The 
federal government has taken action through the 
Energy Policy Act (2005) the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (2009), and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Incentive 
Rates Policy to finance grid improvements.  These 
provisions address the major problems with 
transmission upgrades: siting, permitting, cost 
allocation and cost recovery.  The financial burden 
of upgrading the transmission grid falls on 
utilities.  In 2010 members of the Edison Electric 
Institute (which make up 70% of the US electric 
power industry) invested $10.6 billion into the 
transmission system in 2010 and plan to invest 
an additional $54 billion between 2011 and 2014. 
27 They will recuperate this investment through 
charges to ratepayers at a price negotiated with 
FERC.
Renewable energy presents technology-specific 
challenges to the grid.  Siting for renewable 
energy generation is based on natural provisions. 
Large-scale wind and solar plants (>100MW) are 
often best suited for locations that are far way 
from transmission lines or in areas with limited 
grid capacity.  Renewable energy developments 
put additional pressure on electric companies to 
expand the grid and ensure transmission capacity 
is available.  Additionally, the intermittent nature 
of large-scale renewable energy plants requires 
stricter management from grid operators.  It 
is difficult to predict how much electricity a 
renewable energy plant will generate at a given 
point in time.  Grid operators must plan around 
this fact and manage traditional electricity 
deployment around renewable energy flows.  
To avoid issues concerning large transmission 
line connection, proponents of renewable energy 
champion its use for small-scale distributed 
generation.  Distributed generation means 
facilities sited as multiple small generation 






















































Advent of EPAct 2005 and 
FERC Pricing Policies
Figure 2.5 Investments in Transmission Lines in in the United States27
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or a few wind turbines on a farm) near the end 
user.  The electricity from these units goes to the 
end user first (ie: owner of home), and the excess 
is sold back through the grid.  The advantage of 
distribution generation is the lack of a need for 
large-scale transmission lines.  Such systems also 
reduce grid congestion and energy loss because 
electricity is circulating in a smaller geographic 
area. 
The value of distributed generation for electricity 
production is questionable in terms of capacity 
added, time required and grid management. 
Distributed generation systems to not add a great 
deal of capacity to the electric grid, unless there 
are many individual systems.  The time required 
to install enough of these systems to equal a 
large-scale generating facility is excessive.  If a 
state is trying to grow renewable capacity quickly, 
large-scale plants offer greater capacity and less 
individualized review.  They also make it easier for 
grid managers to monitor their electricity inputs, 
because rather than monitoring many small 
systems grid operators only have to monitor a few 
large-scale ones.
LIMITS TO RESEARCH
The research conducted thus far covers the 
primary issues and solutions surrounding the 
growth of renewable electricity generation and 
distribution.  While each of the solutions has 
its strength and weaknesses they are all broad 
“best-practices” and there is little information 
regarding the implementation of these policies. 
The information is also strongly focuses on 
the perspective of policy makers and utilities, 
but there is a lack of information regarding the 
experience of renewable energy developers and 
the challenges they face getting projects online. 
More study of the development process will 
offer insight into how the deregulation of the 
electricity industry, the state of the electric grid 
and interconnection issues and renewable energy 
policies affect the experience of developers and 
the decisions they make during development.  It 
will also enable planners to identify areas where 
they can make valuable contributions to the field.
BACKGROUND
Background knowledge of the New York electric 
industry structure is necessary to understand its 
policies.  Some background on the components of 
wind development is also necessary to understand 
the perspective of wind developers on the State’s 
policies.  The following section outlines the 
fundamentals of New York’s electric industry, 
regulatory bodies and the basic of building a wind 
farm.
THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK
New York State provides an interesting landscape 
for examining issues surrounding renewable 
energy development due to its significant shifts in 
electricity policy over the past 20 years and more 
recent efforts to grow the amount of renewable 
energy consumed in the state.  Reflecting on these 
policies and their impacts on the electric industry 
in New York offers insight into issues facing 
renewable electricity and how future policies can 
effectively address them.  
New York has three main bodies that regulate its 
electric industry: the Public Service Commission, 
the New York Independent Systems Operator 
and the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority.  The Public Service 
Commission (PSC) formulates the State’s 
electricity policies and governs the siting of 
electric generating facilities.  The New York 
Independent Systems Operate (NYISO) regulates 
the electric grid and oversees electricity pricing 
the state.  The New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority (NYSERDA) implements 
policies created by the PSC to increase renewable 
energy and energy efficiency in New York.  Together 
these agencies ensure that renewable electric 
generating facilities are properly located, can be 
connected to the existing electric grid and have 
the opportunity to take advantage of New York’s 
financial support programs.
In 1993 the Public Service Commission began 
deregulated New York’s electricity markets to 
increase competition and lower the price of 
electricity in the state.  This meant it had to decide 
how to structure the deregulated wholesale and 
retail markets, including how to deal with the 
split in ownership between the transmission and 
distribution of energy. 
As a result the PSC established the New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO) to regulate 
electricity pricing, manage the dispatch of power 
through the grid, oversee the connection of new 
electric generation facilities and maintain system 
reliability.  Its role as a monitor of electricity 
prices is particularly important responsibility 
because it protects consumers and utilities from 
paying excessive rates.  Under this responsibility 
NYISO imposes a number of bidding rules.  These 
rules state that NYISO will not accept the “highest 
bid price,” submitted by electric generators for 
wholesale purchase. NYISO also tries to “mitigate 
market effects of any conduct that would 
substantially distort competitive outcomes.”  This 
conduct being: any conduct that is significantly 
inconsistent with competitive conduct or any 
conduct that results in material changes in one 
of more prices in New York’s electricity market, 
ie: a physical withholding of output, an economic 
withholding of output (unjustifiably high bids) 
or the uneconomic production of output (to take 
advantage of the transmission constraint). 28  In 
essence NYISO imposes regulated prices instead 
of market set prices for electricity, but the system 
is more closely aligned with the free market than 
before.
New York is also committed to increasing 
renewable energy generation and energy 
efficiency.  To this end, the New York State Energy 
Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) 
has been given authority by the PSC to govern a 
myriad of financing programs that make the use 
of energy efficient technologies and development 
of renewable energy less cost-intense.  These 
programs include a Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, grants and loans for energy efficiency 
and customer-sited renewable energy and state-
funded research and design.  The organization 
and its programs are funded through a Systems 
Benefits Charge (SBC) and a Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) charge on all ratepayers of the 
State’s major investor-owned utilities.  The SBC 
was created in 1996 and has been approved for 
continuance until 2016.  The RPS was created in 
2004 and is scheduled to terminate in 2015.
THE ECONOMICS OF WIND DEVELOPMENT
There are several necessary components to wind 
development.  These are:
1. Access to land with high wind speeds
2. Financial agreements with local municipalities
3. Siting and permit approval
4. Interconnection approval
5. REC and electricity purchasers
To secure access to land with high wind speeds 
the developer can lease or purchase property.  If 
being leased, the developer will have to negotiate 
lease agreements with local property owners.  The 
developer will also have to make arrangements 
with the town and county for payments in lieu of 
taxes on the profits generated by the wind farm. 
Usually the developer will pay for the town’s 
lawyers and consultants to write and review these 
contracts.
In addition to financial agreements with 
landowners and municipalities, the developer 
must also secure permits from the state and local 
governments to ensure that the project complies 
with the environmental standards of the state 
and local zoning laws.  The developer must also 
secure interconnection approval from the state’s 
grid system operator.  The burden of cost for the 
permits and engineering studies to support his 
argument for permit and interconnection is borne 
by the developer.
To recuperate his costs the developer can 
sell electricity, sell RECs and use the federal 
production tax credit.  A simplified list of the costs 
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and revenues for wind development can be found 
in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Simplified List of Revenues and Costs for 
Renewable Energy Projects 29
Revenues Costs
Energy Sales Capital Costs:
Production Tax Credit   Equipment
REC Sales   Siting and Permitting
Other incentives/rebates   Labor
Capacity revenues   Interconnection
  Land lease/Purchase
Expenses:
  Debt Service
  Fuel Costs
  Operations & 
  Maintenance
  Property Taxes
  Income Taxes
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY
New York State is seemingly committed to 
renewable energy generation.  It has the third 
largest RPS target in the country (out-matched by 
only California and Hawaii) and has periodically 
reviewed and altered the program to make 
it more effective since its inception. 30     New 
York’s PSC initially implemented the RPS in 2004, 
mandating 25% of New York’s electricity to come 
from renewable sources by 2013.  In 2010 the PSC 
expanded the target to 30% by 2015.
Under the RPS, NYSERDA is authorized to 
make power purchase agreements with large-
scale renewable electricity generators for their 
renewable energy credits (referred to as “attributes” 
in the state).  NYSERDA also provide tax incentives, 
loans and rebates to customer-sited renewable 
generation technologies.  Customer-sited and 
large-scale renewable generation facilities are 
planned to jointly achieve the RPS goal, but the 
state expects a larger proportion of energy to 
come from large-scale plants (roughly 94%) than 
customer-sited facilities (roughly 6%) due to their 
greater generating capacity. 31  To date, New York 
has achieved 48% of its large-scale generation 
target and 39% of its customer-sited generation 
target.32  
Figure 4.1 provides a breakdown of New York’s 
renewable generation capacity by source.  The 
table shows that 91% New York’s current 
renewable generation capacity comes from wind. 
Most of this capacity was added between 2004 
and 2009. 33   This is a 28 times the capacity that 
existed in the state prior to the RPS and places 
New York 12th in the country for installed wind 
power capacity.  These figures suggest that the 
policies and regulatory structure in place between 
2004 and 2009 were successful in attracting wind 
development to the state.   However, in 2011 New 
York changed its siting and permitting processes 
for construction and interconnection of electric 
facilities.  This shift suggests that the regulations 
that governed new generation construction 
during the State’s period of most rapid growth 
were flawed.  
Examining the efficacy of New York’s RPS and 
regulatory framework through the lens of large-
scale wind development provides the most 
fodder for understanding how these policies and 
regulations impact development on the ground. 
The abundance of wind development in the New 
York provides a strong base for the comparison of 
different experiences.  The fact that wind farms 
are sizeable, industrial projects means they have 
the potential to face the greatest development 
challenges.  
This thesis looks to the experience of large-scale 
wind developers as well as the perspective of 
policymakers and policy influencers to understand 
how New York’s programs create and mitigate 
barriers to wind farm development.  The thesis 
considers the role and structure of New York’s 
RPS in cultivating wind development in the 
state.  It speculates on impact of the recent shift 
in regulation for the siting and interconnection 
of electric generation facilities on wind 
development.  And it aims to identify ways in 
which New York’s policies and regulations can be 
improved to facilitate continued growth of the 
State’s renewable generation capacity.
The research for the thesis was conducted 
through phone interviews with wind developers, 
policy makers, and individuals at not for profit 
organizations concerned with energy.  10 
interviews were conducted between January 1st 
and April 1st 2013.  Of those interviews 3 were 
with renewable energy developers, 3 were with 
individuals who work in New York State electric 
agencies (2 of whom also worked for wind 
development companies in New York between 
2004 and 2010), and 3 were with individuals from 
not for profit organizations that deal with energy 
policy.  The names of the interviewees have been 
changed in this paper to protect privacy.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The research conducted for this thesis revealed 
that New York State policies and development 
processes create formidable barriers to wind 
development.  The success of wind projects is also 
strongly influenced by politics and the political 
economy.  In terms of policy, the structure of and 
duration of the RPS can foster the uncertainty the 
program tries to address.  In terms of development, 
the process for siting and interconnection approval 
was demanding and uneven prior to 2011, and 
now appears to be too inflexible.  Additionally, 
under both regulatory structures overcoming 
public opposition can be challenging. 
This portion of the thesis will explore these 
barriers in greater depth, and the specific aspects 
of New York’s policies and regulatory structure 
that present the greatest challenges for wind 
development.
POLICY BARRIERS
The Renewable Portfolio Standard in New 
York is a crucial to wind industry because it 
creates a demand market, and financial support 
mechanisms.  However, not all RPSs are created 
equal, and the design of an RPS influences both its 
success and how attractive a state is to renewable 
energy development.  To understand the barriers 
present in the design of New York’s Renewable 












Wind 1,326.3 327.9 1,654.2 13 4 17
Hydroelectric 42.2 8.9 51.3 22 3 25
Biomass 31.0 43.3 74.3 2 1 3
Biogas 56.9 4.8 61.7 9 2 11
Totals 1,456.6 384.9 1,841.5 46 10 56
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Portfolio Standard, a deeper understanding of 
the program’s configuration is necessary.  This 
section explains New York’s RPS in greater depth, 
and highlights the specific areas that present 
challenges to wind development, as identified 
through interviews with wind developers who 
have worked in the state. 
New York State adopted a RPS on September 24, 
2004 through an executive order issued by the 
New York State Public Service Commission (PSC). 
The PSC had been considering the implementation 
of an RPS since 2002, when the New York State 
Energy Plan of that year, “warned of the possible 
consequences of New York’s fossil fuel dependency, 
noting that the State’s primary sources of energy 
are imported to a large degree, from abroad, have 
significant long-term environmental effects, and 
ultimately face depletion.” 35   As a result, a RPS was 
approved as a reliable tool for increasing sources 
of renewable power in the state and reducing the 
state’s existing reliance on imported fossil fuels.  
At the time 19.3% of New York’s electricity was 
derived from renewable sources, mainly from 
hydroelectric plants in upstate New York.  Through 
the RPS the PSC set the goal of increasing the 
amount of renewable electricity consumed to 25% 
by 2013.  This goal included energy from existing 
facilities so the actual net growth of renewable 
energy was targeted at 5.7%.  Of that target, 24% 
of the renewable electricity was expected to come 
from mandates on electricity sources, while 1% 
would be derived from the voluntary green power 
market. 
In order to participate in the RPS program two 
categories of generating capacity were conceived: 
“Main Tier” and “Customer-Sited Tier” (CST). 
Main tier facilities are medium-large scale 
electric generation facilities while CST facilities 
are “’behind the meter’ facilities not generally 
economically competitive enough to compete 
with Main Tier technologies.” 36  In the Main 
Tier biogas, biomass, liquid biofuel, fuel cells, 
hydroelectric, photovoltaic, ocean or tidal power 
and wind are all qualifying technologies.  In the 
CST only photovoltaic, fuel cells and wind are 
eligible.
In order to reach its goal the PSC recognized that 
it must provide financing options to renewable 
electricity generators to offset the costs of 
development.  Funding to finance renewable 
energy development comes from an RPS surcharge 
on each kilowatt-hour sold by the State’s investor-
owned utility companies.  The proceeds of the RPS 
surcharge are used to fund both the Main Tier and 
Customer-Sited Tier financing programs.
Main Tier financing for renewable electricity 
is distributed through production payment 
incentives to renewable energy generators in a 
unique central procurement model administered 
by the New York State Research and Development 
Authority (NYSERDA).  NYSERDA does not procure 
electricity directly. It signs 10-year contracts on 
behalf of utilities with renewable electricity 
generators.  The contracts pay generators for the 
RPS attributes associated with up to 95% of each 
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity produced 
(these attributes are same as the Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECs) described in the literature 
review section of this thesis).  5% of the attributes 
are exempt from contract with NYSERDA for sale 
on the voluntary market, although developers can 
sell less than 95% of their attributes to NYSERDA 
if they choose.  36
The central procurement model used in New 
York is unique.  Most states require utilities to 
independently purchase renewable energy credits 
(either bundled with electricity or unbundled) 
to comply with their state’s RPS.  New York also 
puts restrictions on facilities that can qualify for 
a NYSERDA contract.  For all Main Tier Facilities 
under contract with NYSERDA the electricity 
associated with the RPS Attributes must be:
1. Delivered into a market administered by 
the New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO) for end- use in New York State; or 
2. Delivered through a wholesale meter under 
the control of a utility, public authority or 
municipal electric company such that it can be 
measured, and such that consumption within 
New York State can be tracked and verified by 
such entity or by the NYISO; or 
3. Delivered through a dedicated generation 
meter, which shall be approved by and subject 
to independent verification by NYSERDA, 
to a customer in New York State (excluding 
customers in the service territory of the Long 
Island Power Authority) whose electricity was 
obtained through the NYISO/utility system as 
of January 20, 2011.  37
Obtaining a contract with NYSERDA is a 
competitive process.  Renewable energy 
developers must bid for contracts when NYSERDA 
issues a Request for Proposals (RFP).  To date, 
NYSERDA has solicited seven competitive Main 
Tier RFPs.  Most of the contracts have been signed 
with wind power generators.  The first RFP was 
issued in January 2005 and issues contract awards 
based on the price bid of RPS Attributes alone. 
The solicitation resulted in contracts with 2 wind 
facilities and three hydroelectric facility upgrades. 
The weighted average production incentive was 
$22.90 per MWh.   38
After the first solicitation, NYSERDA decided to 
alter the determination process for contracts. 
Awards became based on two evaluation 
components (1) the bid price, weighted at 70% 
and (2) the ability of the bidder to demonstrate 
economic benefits to New York State created by 
the development, construction and operation of 
the facility, weighted at 30%.39 The second RFP 
was issued in 2007 and resulted in 20 new or 
upgraded facilities contracts, with a weighted 
average price award of $15.52 per MWh.  The two-
step, weighted decision model has been used in 
all subsequent solicitations by NYSERDA.  40 
After seven rounds of solicitation NYSERDA 
has signed contracts or has pending contracts 
to purchase RPS Attributes from 56 renewable 
electricity facilities, 53 of which are in New York 
State.  These facilities will generate a total of 1,841 
MW of electricity, 1,654 MW of which will be wind 
power.  The average incentive award has varied 
each round, with the lowest price being $14.75 
per MW in 2007 and the highest price $28.70 in 
2011.42  Although not the sole factor contributing 























Figure 5.1 New York Wind Capacity 2000-2011 41
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to these price fluctuations, the recent drop in 
the price of natural gas has reduced the prices 
for electricity in the wholesale market and thus 
increased the bid price of renewables.  Natural gas 
prices are anticipated to remain low in the future, 
which means future solicitations by NYSERDA 
will likely see competitive bid submissions on the 
higher side of the price spectrum.
Figure 5.2 NYSERDA Main Tier Solicitations- Weighted 

















The RPS and accompanying renewable energy 
attribute purchases are critical to the development 
of New York’s renewable electricity industry; they 
create both demand for renewable power and 
financial stability.  The deregulated state of the 
electricity industry in New York increases the 
price volatility of the wholesale electricity market. 
This makes it difficult for renewable electricity 
developers, and investors to calculate how long 
it will take to recuperate the cost of development 
from selling electricity.  Furthermore, low natural 
gas prices are driving down the price of energy 
making the sale of energy less profitable to wind 
generators.  By selling renewable energy attributes, 
renewable electricity generators are able to make 
a reasonable calculations of how long it will take 
for their project to make a return on investment 
(ROI), and maintain a stable income stream until 
that point in time.  
At the same time, the stability and sustainability 
of the RPS program itself is uncertain.  The RPS 
was created out of an executive order of the PSC 
and expires in 2015.  Unlike most other states 
where the commitment established by an RPS 
lasts indefinitely, there is no existing obligation 
for New York to maintain its 30% renewable 
electricity mandate after that year.    If the political 
climate shifts, or the price point of natural gas 
becomes more attractive to the public than the 
environmental benefits of renewables the RPS 
and any mandate for renewable electricity could 
easily cease to exist after 2015.  On the other 
hand, even if the program is maintained, future 
commitments to renewable electricity could be 
low and stifle potential growth in New York’s 
renewable electricity generation market.  The 
PSC is planning to evaluate the future of the 
RPS program this year, but has yet to give an 
indication of what the state’s future policies 
towards renewable energy will be. 
All of the wind developers interviewed agreed that 
the biggest factor in whether to enter a state is the 
existence of an RPS program, and how high the 
target percentage of renewables is.  One developer 
(referred to as J) stated this quite succinctly saying, 
“we won’t go into a state without an RPS and we 
actively target states with better RPS programs, 
that’s built into our business model.” 44 He then 
cited Hawaii as having a particularly attractive 
RPS program (the state is currently mandating that 
40% of electricity sold to consumers by utilities 
must be renewable by 2030). 45    According to J, 
it is not economically viable for a wind developer 
to enter a market without an RPS because there 
is no demand for renewables in states without an 
enforceable standard.  Furthermore, the greater 
the requirement for renewables is, the higher the 
demand will be for their renewable energy credits. 
Additionally, J commented on how easily it is for 
an RPS to change or be revoked due to political 
influences and pressure for public agencies to hit 
their targets without excessive spending.  J said, 
If a state doesn’t think it’s going to hit its 
targets or the program’s putting to much 
strain on ratepayers it can easily lower 
[its RPS goals] and that’s bad news for us 
because they’re reducing our demand.” 46  
There is a tension here between the obligations 
of public authorities to their citizens, and the 
market conditions that drive wind development. 
Obviously, developers are most motivated to go 
where demand for their product is highest, and 
where they can make long-term profits.  However, 
states are under pressure to grow renewable 
sources of electricity without exploiting the 
financial resources of their ratepayers.  States 
want to be sure that their policies are transparent, 
do not impose excessive rates on their customers 
and grow capacity quickly to bring lower-cost 
electricity to the market in the long-term.  
New York is very wary of this and has designed its 
policies to favor the financial interests of the public 
more so than other states in New England.  While 
New York wants to grow its renewable capacity 
quickly, it aims to do so in the most economic way 
possible.  It has designed its RPS without “hard 
targets” for increasing renewable energy (unlike 
other states that require the amount of renewable 
energy to increase X amount each year until the 
ultimate target is reached).  This structure allows 
NYSERDA to be selective about the price it pays 
for renewable energy attributes and keeps the cost 
of purchasing attributes low.  These lower costs 
are also ensured through the competitive bidding 
process NYSERDA uses to award contracts. 47  
New York’s REC policy is designed to help 
developers recuperate the costs of development 
without using RPS funds to generate profit.  The 
PSC elaborates on this point in its 2004 Proceeding 
on Motion of the Commission Regarding a Retail 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, saying:
“…No renewable generator should receive 
more than is necessary for incremental 
projects to be built; a Staff audit should 
determine the least cost renewable 
projects and those should be built; RPS 
payments plus energy, capacity and 
ancillary services revenues should equal 
the cost of a given renewable generation 
unit; and, if RPS payments exceed cost, on 
an annual basis, consumers should receive 
a credit. “ 48
Furthermore, NYSERDA does not purchase 
renewable energy attributes indefinitely, it will 
only sign a 10-year contract with generators 
with the intent of helping them recuperate the 
sunk costs of development.  After these 10-year 
contracts end, NYSERDA and the PSC anticipate 
renewable energy attributes generated by New 
York facilities to be sold on the voluntary market. 
49
The structure of the attribute selling system in 
New York serves the goals of the state well - it 
enables the state to get facilities online quickly 
and remove the state’s obligation to pay for 
attributes indefinitely.  However, developers have 
mixed feelings about the attribute payment 
system.  A minority of developers choose to sell 
less than 95% of their attributes to NYSERDA 
because they anticipate prices in other markets 
to be high in the future and want the freedom 
to be able to take advantage of that.  However, 
most developers prefer the long-term contract 
approach because it offers financial stability. 
These developers would like the contracts to be 
longer.  They are not enthused about selling their 
attributes on the voluntary market after their 
contracts with NYSERDA end because prices in 
the voluntary market are low. 50
However the bid process for receiving contracts 
with NYSERDA is highly competitive and political. 
The structure also limits the amount of wind 
development in the state.  Without a contract with 
NYSERDA a developer has nowhere to else to sell 
their attributes in the state, besides the voluntary 
market.  The significant contrast in NYSERDA 
prices and voluntary prices (anywhere from $12-
20) means securement of a NYSERDA contract can 
make or break a project.  For this reason the bid 
process is very aggressive.  According to J, 
“There is fierce competition when RFPs 
get issued because PPAs are much easier 
to finance- they give you revenues for 10 
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years.  So when you’re in that competitive 
bid process it’s not uncommon to see low 
bids, but lowballing does not necessarily 
win in the end.  It’s your reputation, 
experience and proven access to financing 
that determines whether or not you get 
that contract.” 51
Another developer interviewed, referred to as 
T, felt NYSERDA’s decision-making process was 
political as well.  He illustrated this point through 
his own experience trying to get a contract:
“Well we just missed an RFP deadline, but 
we had all of permits and agreements in 
place and we didn’t want to sit on the 
project for another year.  So we decided to 
start construction and apply for a contract 
when the next solicitation came out. And 
you know, that was good for us because we 
knew our construction costs and we were 
able to prepare a very aggressive bid.  But 
then when the next RFP came out they said 
you couldn’t have started construction, 
because they thought since we had 
already started building we didn’t need 
the contract.  So we had to lobby very hard 
to NYSERDA and the PSC and eventually 
they allowed us to bid the next time but 
we couldn’t claim any economic benefits 
and so we had to bid very low which meant 
we lost money.  I don’t think that was fair, 
we need the rules to stay constant.” 52
Even though NYSERDA has a weighted 2-part 
process for giving out contracts that supposedly 
only looks at economic benefits to the state and 
attribute price, both developers who had been 
through the process felt that the review was 
also political. It appears contract decisions are 
affected by NYSERDA’s perception of the company 
who submitted the bid.  This subjectivity presents 
a real challenge in a process that is crucial to the 
success of wind development project.
Additional pressure is put on the bid price of a 
contract with NYSERDA due to the lack of options 
for selling attributes after those contracts end. 
Because prices on the voluntary market are so 
low, and the voluntary market is less robust than 
compliance markets a developer must try to make 
as much money off of his contract as possible.  At 
the same time, NYSERDA does not differentiate 
between technologies in the bid process meaning 
that capital-intensive projects must also be able 
to compete against lower cost technologies. 
A developer’s bid cannot be too high or the 
developer will not win a contract with NYSERDA 
at all, but it must be high enough to provide a 
financial incentive.  According to T, the absence of 
a post-contract compliance market for attributes 
was something that his company did not consider 
until they had already started the development 
process, and he believes many other companies 
had the same experience.  He saw this as a large 
flaw in New York’s RPS design, and explained his 
opinion as such:
“In New York they said renewable energy 
costs more so we need to give them a 
subsidy.  We want to give them an upfront 
subsidy over the first 10 years to cover 
their costs.  But, once you’ve sold to 
NYSERDA there is nowhere else to sell 
RECs [attributes] in New York.  Their hope 
is that the voluntary market will pop up 
and they will purchase RECs after the 
NYSERDA contracts end, but RECs on the 
voluntary market only sell for $1-2.  In 
Texas all of the utilities have an obligation 
to buy indefinitely so we don’t have this 
problem.
We, as developers, don’t know what is 
going to happen which means we have to 
build the project assuming we will make 
all of our money in the first 10 years.
The benefit to the state is that once the 10 
years is up the wind farms will sell power 
at a very low price.  In the wholesale market 
you bid at the lowest cost you can stomach 
selling your electricity at so the state gets 
pretty low cost power from operating wind 
plants.  Their mentality is get the projects 
online, pay for it up front, after 10 years it 
will pay off because they will have lower 
wholesale prices.  It’s not really a long-
term sustaining market though because it 
requires everything to cost more upfront.”53
When T was asked how what his ideal model for 
selling RECs would be, he said: 
“Renewable energy projects have high 
capital costs with long-term benefits and 
you need to have financing structures that 
take advantage of that.  You need policies 
that have a long horizon. I would like to 
see counter-parties whether it’s a state 
or private entity, sign a power-purchasing 
agreement for 20 years.  There can be 
flexibility but we want long-term contracts 
that can spread costs over time.  Prices 
could start low and get higher or vice 
versa, but either way the savings in fuel 
costs would be cheaper for the state and 
would ultimately offer power at a lower 
price than other sources.
[Wind developers] have a level of certainty 
that other generators that don’t get, we 
don’t have to worry about predicting fuel 
prices and utilities should recognize that.  
There are some utilities that do- in states 
where utilities are required to purchase a 
certain amount of renewables, and they 
are forward thinking.  They are willing to 
sign these long-term contracts but only 
because the RPS commitment is indefinite, 
unlike New York. “ 54
A review of RPS bid prices conducted for NYSERDA 
in 2008 came to a similar conclusion.  The study 
included interviews with all renewable energy 
developers who had signed contracts with 
NYSERDA.  75% of the developers interviewed 
said that they would prefer 20 year contracts for 
selling their attributes because they would be 
taking on less revenue-risk and would be better 
equipped to secure project financing. 55
The state appears to be less concerned with 
the issue of ROI than developers.  They feel that 
after the sunk costs of development have been 
recuperated, the only financial gain developers 
should receive should be from the selling of 
electricity.  While this may be in the interest 
of ratepayers, it creates disincentives for wind 
developers to enter New York.  If a developer 
knows that other markets offer indefinite RPS 
terms and the price of RECs will be determined 
by a compliance market, not a voluntary market 
then that state offers more financial potential 
than New York.  Furthermore, if states have other 
RPS design programs that drive up REC prices like 
yearly percentage mandates, mandates on specific 
technologies or Alternative Compliance Payments.
This disconnection between the desired outcomes 
of the state and the market conditions perceived 
as ideal by developers can limit the growth of 
the wind in New York.  The state thinks that it is 
providing enough of an incentive for renewable 
development by created market demand through 
its RPS and financing support by purchasing 
attributes through NYSERDA.  However, the 
REC market in New York is limited by its central 
procurement model.  Without a contract with 
NYSERDA there is no where to sell RECs in New 
York, and the competitive bidding process makes 
securing a REC purchaser more difficult that it is in 
other states.  The more attractive REC markets in 
other states can divert the interests of developers 
from entering the New York market and thus 
limit New York’s success in consuming renewable 
energy.
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
While New York’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
and attribute payment system may not be ideal 
to wind developers, the most tangible challenges 
they face arise during the development process. 
Barriers faced during development drive up 
the costs of a project and create frustration for 
developers in the New York market.   Mitigating 
these challenges is a goal of state policymakers 
because higher development costs also drive up 
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the selling price of renewable energy attributes 
and subsequently, the cost of renewable energy 
for ratepayers.  The most significant development 
barriers lie in the permit and interconnection 
processes. New York has recently changed its 
policy for siting electric generation facilities 
and interconnection procedure in the hopes of 
addressing some of these challenges.  However, 
no new wind farms have been approved under this 
new regulatory structure.  Thus, this section of the 
paper describes some of the common challenges 
for developers under the old regulatory structure 
and offers insights from developers on how the 
new structure alters barriers in the development 
process. 
In order for a wind development to reach 
fruition it must meet the environmental and 
interconnection standards of the State.  New York 
has comprehensive measures for contemplating 
the environmental impacts of any large 
development project, which are outlined in the 
State Environmental Quality Review (SEQR). 
SEQR requires developers to identify and mitigate 
any significant environmental impacts proposed 
by the project. 56  Local municipalities used SEQR 
to administer site approval for wind development 
until 2011; however, on August 4th of that year 
New York reinstated Article X for the siting of 
electric generation facilities. Under Article X siting 
applications are now reviewed at the State level. 
Developers also need to ensure that the project 
can be successfully integrated with the existing 
electric distribution grid, through approval from 
the New York State Independent Systems Operator 
(NYISO). Independent System Operators in every 
state are under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and at 
their direction, NYISO has also recently altered its 
interconnection procedures.
INTERCONNECTION
Interconnection approval from NYISO is the most 
fundamental requirement for a wind project to 
achieve completion. Without the ISO’s assurance 
that the project can be connected to the grid, all 
other permits and approvals are meaningless. 
Concerns about grid capacity are not really a 
problem in New York, in 2008 NYISO performed 
a study of its grid capacity and found that it 
could absorb 8,000 MW of additional renewable 
energy. 57   However, there are challenges for 
wind developers inherent in the interconnection 
process NYISO uses for interconnection approval.
NYISO uses a 3-phase process to evaluate the 
interconnection feasibility of a new generating 
facility.  Prior to even entering this 3-phase process 
the developer must submit an interconnection 
request to NYISO, along with a $10,000 application 
fee, a $30,000 study deposit and a demonstration 
of site control or an additional $10,000 in lieu of 
a site control demonstration.  Once these have 
been received, the project enters NYISO’s queue 
of projects awaiting interconnection study and 
approval.  The three phases of the study are:
1. Feasibility Study: to develop a conceptual 
design for the proposed interconnection, 
evaluate the impact of the project on the pre-
existing electric system at and in electrical 
proximity to the POI (point of interconnection), 
preliminarily identify the CTO (Connecting 
Transmission Owner) Attachment Facilities 
and any System Upgrade Facilities (SUFs) that 
would be required to interconnect the project 
to the system in a reliable manner, and develop 
nonbinding good faith estimates of the cost 
and time to construct the required facilities. 
2. System Reliability Impact Study: to again 
evaluate the impact of the project on the 
pre-existing electric system (based on the 
conceptual interconnection design from the 
Feasibility Study), re-evaluate and revise as 
necessary the list of CTO Attachment Facilities 
and any SUFs identified in the Feasibility Study, 
and re-evaluate and revise as necessary the 
nonbinding good faith estimates of the cost 
and time to construct the required facilities.
3. Interconnection Agreement: After completion 
of the requisite interconnection studies, the 
next step of the interconnection process 
is to develop, negotiate, and execute an 
Interconnection Agreement.  The Large 
Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) 
is a three-party agreement between the 
Developer, NYISO and CTO. 58 
In laymen’s terms provided by S (an employee at 
NYISO who worked as a wind developer prior to 
joining the organization)…
“The first phase is a high level study to 
give the developer an idea of does this 
make sense? Can I move forward?  And will 
the project be economical? It’s basically a 
cost estimate.  The second phase provides 
more detail about feasibility.  And the third 
phase is binding. The developer, NYISO, 
and the utility enter into an agreement to 
spell out the cost in exact detail as well as 
the construction and operation of project.” 
59
The cost for the studies and the construction cost 
of interconnection is borne by the developer.  The 
total cost for the studies (not including actual 
construction of transmission lines) is typically 
around $300,000.  The standard timeframe for 
interconnection is 3 years but that can vary for 
individual projects.
NYISO’s primary objective is to maintain the 
reliability of the grid.  According to S, 
“For anything that gets connected to grid 
NYISO needs to ensure that there is no 
deterioration in reliability, that means 
no overloads or any reliability issues 
downstream.  Our primary goal is to 
identify what is the cost of connecting that 
project- what does developer need to do 
cost wise and tech wise to avoid reliability 
problems?  We achieve that through the 
studies.  We ask what are the weak points?  
What are the consequences of connecting 
the project?  What needs to be done to 
maintain reliability?  We then identify the 
cost that developer would need to pay 
to avoid that through installations and 
system upgrades, and it’s the developer’s 
responsibility to pay for those upgrades.” 60
Developers used to have the option of hiring 
independent consultants to perform the Feasibility 
and System Reliability Impact Studies, but recently 
NYISO’s policy has shifted due to federal pressure 
to standardize and speed up interconnection 
approval.  NYISO has independent authority 
over electricity transmission in New York but it 
is regulated by FERC.  In 2003, FERC recognized 
that interconnection procedures across states 
were unstandardized and created delays in the 
approval process.  As a result FERC issued Order 
2003 that established a standard interconnection 
process across the nation. States were then given 
the opportunity to follow the standard procedures 
or file variances as long as they were “equal or 
superior to the standard agreement… included in 
Order 2003.” 61  This order resulted in an influx 
of interconnection requests in ISO queues across 
the country.  As a result, in 2008 FERC urged state 
ISOs to clean out their queues and create stricter 
timeframes for moving projects through the 
approval process. 62    
Under pressure from the federal government, 
NYISO removed the option for developers to hire 
their own consultants and NYISO now conducts 
all of the studies.  According to S, this is a positive 
change for NYISO because 
“In last few years when things slowed down, 
developers could put interconnection 
studies on ice and not make any progress 
on them for months or years on end.  Those 
project proposals were taking position in 
queue and had to be accounted for but 
they were not making any progress and 
were diverting resources.  Now there’s 
going to be a more consistent approach 
to the development process with NYISO 
managing.  The rules will be more evenly 
applied and we will no longer allow 
developers to park in the queue.” 63
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However, he agreed with other developers 
interviewed in that this stricter timeframe 
creates a level of inflexibility that developers 
don’t like.  In order to sign an Interconnection 
Agreement with NYISO the project must have 
also received all of the siting and environmental 
permits necessary to for build out.  Getting these 
permits can also be time consuming, and are 
subject to their own barriers (described later in 
this section).  A developer may move through the 
interconnection process quickly but get held up 
receiving siting permits (less of a problem after 
the 2011 shift in siting policy explained later) or 
negotiating contracts with landholders and local 
municipalities.  If the developer cannot continue 
to move forward in the process due to outside 
setbacks he will get kicked out of the queue and 
have to start over.
T also found the NYISO approval process difficult 
because 
“You have to put up significant amounts 
of money with no contract in place, and 
sometimes the company will want to put 
something on hold but NYISO doesn’t 
want us to.  At the end of the day do 
those decisions benefit ratepayers? Or 
make the process smoother? … They do 
very expensive studies and the value of 
those studies is questionable.  They also 
have hard time grappling with the fact 
that these are very expensive projects 
that don’t move forward until we get all 
our agreements and a [power purchase 
agreement] to sell RECs with NYSERDA.  
The whole thing is very cumbersome.” 64
Again there is tension here between the objectives 
of the state and the ability of developers to satisfy 
those objectives.  NYISO’s goal is to get projects 
online that won’t disrupt the reliability of the grid 
and to get them approved quickly so that FERC is 
not critical of their performance.  The “expensive 
studies” questioned in value by T are clearly 
considered of value to NYISO who has to be sure 
that new projects will not negatively impact 
electricity delivery in the state.  At the same time, 
NYISO is focused on only one aspect of wind 
development while the developer needs to achieve 
multiple approvals at once.  The inflexibility of 
the interconnection process hinders their ability 
to keep their project moving forward, and seems 
like an unnecessary burden to developers.  
Even though the interconnection approval 
process may be too strict in developers’ opinions, 
the process is less cumbersome than the process 
for obtaining environmental permits.  When 
asked to compare his own experience with NYISO 
to other challenges he faced working as a wind 
developer S said, “NYISO is a known process, a 
rational process that is technically driven. Either 
you cause a problem on the system or you don’t. 
The only issue for debate is the costs of getting 
the system online without causing a reliability 
problem.  It’s a very engineering driven process. 
The real challenge in New York and New England 
in general is the permitting process.”  65
PERMITTING 
Prior to 2011 permits for wind farms were granted 
through the State Environmental Quality Review 
process and reviewed at the state and local 
level.  This made the approval process for siting 
wind farms high susceptible to local politics 
and public opposition.  In 2011 Governor Cuomo 
changed this by reinstating Article X for the siting 
of electric generation facilities.  Article X was a 
review process that had been used until 2003. 
After it expired state legislators could not agree 
on how to restructure the policy so it remained 
inactive until 2011.  Under the new Article X, the 
approval for siting electric generation facilities is 
conducted at the state level.  However, no new wind 
projects have been approved for development 
under the new statute at this time.   This portion 
of the thesis will elaborate on challenges created 
by using the SEQR process for approving wind 
projects, the changes to the process under Article 
X and how the new policy mitigates some of the 
SEQR challenges but also create new ones. 
Under the SEQR guidelines developers had to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment 
and release an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) to state and local authorities for review and 
public comment.  The EIS analyzed the effect of 
the project on: 
1. Possible conflicts between the proposed 
action and land use plans, policies, or controls 
for the area concerned
2. Energy requirements and conservation 
potential 
3. Natural or depletable resource requirements 
and conservation potential 
4. Urban quality, historic and cultural resources, 
and design of the built environment 
5. Socially or economically disadvantaged 
populations
6. Wetlands and floodplains 
7. Prime and unique agricultural lands 
8. Endangered or threatened plants and animals 
and their habitats 
9. Important scientific, archaeological, and 
other cultural resources, including historic 
properties listed or eligible for the National 
Register of Historic Places 
10. Ecologically critical areas, Wild and Scenic 
Rivers, or other unique natural resources 
11. Public health and safety 
12. Sacred sites 
13. Indian Trust resources  66
Although a wind project may not affect all of 
these topics, each still had to be analyzed and 
addressed in the EIS.  After analyzing the potential 
impacts of the project the developer would then 
have to apply for the necessary federal, state 
and county permits to construct the facility.  The 
developer would advocate for the permit using 
the information in the EIS.  The list of agencies 
that a developer had to get approval from was 
extensive.  The following table illustrates some of 
the agencies that a wind developer typically had 
to deal with before August 4, 2011: 67
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Although the level of review at each agency varies 
in its involvement, all permits are still required for 
the project.  The approval process for the permits 
had no strict deadline, meaning the process could 
take anywhere from 2-6 years.  Depending on 
the length of the approval period it was easy for 
developers to run out of financing and lose interest 
from their investors.  According to a senior project 
manager at NYSERDA, the most common sources 
of failure for wind developers are the inability to 
obtain the necessary permits for development 
and the inability to secure financing. 68 
The greatest impediments to permitting approval 
for wind developers occurred at the local level, 
where they faced the greatest amount of public 
opposition and demand for information.  Local 
municipalities were often unfamiliar with the 
SEQR process, and had to establish new local 
laws to allow for the development of wind farms. 
Because each municipality has its own government, 
the developer was subject to each municipality’s 
interpretation of SEQR, its requirements and 
its local wind laws.  This situation put a lot of 
pressure of the developer to please everyone, as 
S explained… 
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“When siting is done at the local level 
with different towns and town boards 
the process gets complicated and tricky.  
Among many difficulties was any given 
town’s interpretation of the State’s SEQR 
process.  You could have two different 
towns could look at that process and 
make two different sets of rules in terms 
of applying for permits in their districts… 
Sometimes I would be working on the 
same project but across town boundaries 
which meant I could be working with 6 
different towns and each of those towns 
could have a different interpretations of 
approval process.” 69
This freedom of interpretation also exposed 
developers to the challenge of trying to answer 
emotional questions with rational answers.  As 
well as the nuances of local political forces, which 
can be stronger than political forces at the state 
level.  S described his experience negotiating this 
local political environment as such:
“Before Article X projects were very 
susceptible to influence at the local 
political level.  You have town boards made 
up of volunteers who aren’t in it for the 
same fortune or glory as state politicians 
and they are very susceptible to local 
pressures. Wind development in some 
towns became a hot button topic and you 
would have signs for and against it all over 
the town where a wind farm was proposed, 
and then the town boards are trying to 
determine fate of expensive project while 
the neighbors are mad.  It can put a lot of 
pressure on local governments and lead to 
an unequal application of the rules.
The whole process could easily become 
irrational and you end up in a situation 
where you’re trying to fend off a number of 
allegations like someone heard something 
on the internet and now you have to prove 
that that wouldn’t happen… You have 
different interpretations of noise studies so 
different factions would hire consultants to 
do noise studies and would come up with 
unrealistic assessments of ambient noise 
levels and that would lead to new local 
laws that were unfeasible.  I mean if you 
don’t establish correct ambient noise you 
can create a law that makes development 
impossible.  Basically, the process became 
expensive and convoluted and drawn out.  
It becomes emotional battles as much as 
arguing the merits of the project.” 70
Even when a town welcomes wind development 
public opposition and the demands of local 
governments can create barriers.  In T’s case, the 
town approached the company and asked them to 
consider doing a development there.  However…
“Once we were in the process it became 
a huge public challenge, there was a 
handful of people who weren’t going to 
get turbines and they were angry.  We had 
a few very populated public meetings.  
Residents called the project an eyesore, 
said it was too big and were just generally 
unnecessarily emotional…the opposition 
used a lot of scare tactics- they said it 
would be too loud and would destroy the 
farmland.   And then, under SEQR when 
we released our EIS we hired an engineer 
who reviewed all the information but the 
other side litigated and said review wasn’t 
adequate.” 71
The only real tactic developers had to combat 
this emotional and demanding response to their 
project proposals was to implement strong public 
relations strategies and to underline the economic 
benefits to the town from the development. 
According to M (a current employee of NYSERDA 
who used to work for a wind development 
company) a key factor to her previous company’s 
success was its “boots on the ground” strategy. 
“We had a local office, employed local personnel 
and tried to maintain a constant presence…that 
really gave us an edge on the competition.” 72 
The company gave numerous presentations to 
the local community, held Q&A sessions and 
met with the press frequently.  By keeping the 
community informed and included they were able 
to negotiate leases with local landowners, get the 
necessary local permits and complete the project 
with minimal opposition. 73  S also cited a similar 
strategy with his previous company, 
“All you can do is try to conduct public 
meetings, talk with the public about 
studies out there that address issues that 
they are concerned about and what you are 
proposing.  It became a matter of trying 
to be very proactive about educating the 
community.  Sometimes that would help 
clarify things, or sometimes it would be 
dismissed as industry lies if somebody had 
an entrenched opposition to wind…” 74
Under the SEQR review process wind developers 
not only needed numerous state permits (each 
procured separately), but also the support of the 
local government, county government and the 
owners of the land where they want to construct 
the turbines.  The siting of wind turbines often 
stirs visceral reactions that are hard to deal with 
in a logical manner, and feelings of malcontent 
when not every town member reaps the same 
economic benefit from the development.  The 
excessive time and costs imposed on developers 
trying to overcome significant local demands, 
political subjectivity and public opposition under 
SEQR necessitated a change in policy. It led 
policymakers to believe that streamlining the 
application process for electric generation facility 
permitting would be beneficial to developers and 
ratepayers.  
In part a response to this issue, and in part a 
longstanding goal, on August 4, 2011 Governor 
Cuomo signed chapter 388 of the Power Act of New 
York 2011 enacting Article X- a streamlined, “one-
stop” permitting process for electric generation 
facilities.  Article X, and different forms of the same 
concept, have had a long history in New York State. 
The laws predecessor, Article VIII was enacted in 
1972.  It gave the State Board on Electric Generation 
Siting and the Environment the authority to issue 
Certificates of Environmental Capacity and Public 
Need.  Article VIII established an environmental 
review of proposed projects at the state level, 
allowed limited public participation in the review 
process and gave the state permission to override 
local laws and ordinances.  Article VIII expired on 
January 1, 1989 but was replaced with Article X in 
1992.  In 1999 an amendment was added to Article 
X to allow the Department of Environmental 
Conservation to issue permits in conjunction with 
the certificates of approval issued by the State 
Board. 75
The original Article X expired on January 1st 2003. 
Renewing the statue was became a challenge in 
light of the “restructuring” (deregulation) of New 
York’s electricity market, the recent collapse of 
Enron (which made finding financing for new 
electric generation plants even more difficult) and 
an emerging environmental justice movement 
that objected to the siting of electric generation 
facilities in low-income neighborhoods.76  As 
a result, it took seven years to get the measure 
passed with support from industry, environmental 
advocates, consumer groups, and labor and 
community organizations. 77   Now that Governor 
Cuomo has reinstated Article X proposals for new 
electric generation facilities are solely considered 
under the regulations of Article X and do not 
follow SEQR processes.
The new Article X is similar to its predecessor 
and aims to encourage new investments in clean 
power in the state.  It improves upon SEQR by 
reducing the time required to get project approval 
and focusing the approval requirements more 
Changes between Article VIII and  1992 Article X
1. Expanded scope of environmental review 
2. Greater public participation allowed
3. Requirement for the applicant to set aside 
“intervenor funds” for public or government 
bodies affected by the facility 
4. Shortened Review Process (24 to 12 
months) 
5. Increased applicability threshold from 
50MW to 80MW
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specifically on issues directly related to electricity 
generation.  It employs a multi-agency siting 
board to review the environmental impacts of any 
generating facility over 25 megawatts.  The board 
is overseen by the Chairman of the Department 
of Public Services and includes heads of the 
Department of Environmental Conservation, the 
Department of Public Health, NYSERDA, the 
Economic Development Agency and two members 
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In the pre-application phase applicants must 
file a Public Involvement Program (PIP).  The 
PIP outlines the measures the developer plans 
to take in order to inform the public about the 
development.  The PIP must be filed 150 days 
before the applicant submits a Preliminary 
Scoping Statement (a document that describes 
the proposed facility, the potential environmental 
and health impacts and the measures that will 
be taken to assess the environmental and health 
impacts).  The Preliminary Scoping Statement 
must be filed 90 days before an actual application 
is submitted and must be accompanied by an 
“intervenor fee.”  The intervenor fee funds the 
hiring expert witnesses, consultants or lawyers 
by municipal parties and local parties.  The fee 
is $350 per MW of generating capacity up to 
$200,000.  The Preliminary Scoping Statement 
is then open to the public for comments and the 
applicant is required to respond with written 
comments. 79
If the applicant successfully completes the pre-
application requirements, they can submit an 
application for review to the siting board.  The 
application must include: 
• A project description
• All of the public involvement activity
• Facility and community security and safely plans 
Evaluation of the anticipated environmental 
and health impacts, environmental justice 
issues 
• Alternative locations for the project.  
The application must also be accompanied by a 
second contribution of $1,000 per megawatt of 
capacity up to $400,00 to the intervenor fund.  If 
the application meets all of the requirements of 
the board, a public hearing will be set no later 
than 60 days from the date of submission. 80
At the public hearing the application is presented 
to representatives from the Department of 
Public Service, the Department of Environmental 
Conservation, the Department of Economic 
Development, the Department of health, the 
Department of Agriculture and Markets, NYSERDA, 
the Department of State, and the Office of Parks 
Recreation and Historic Preservation.  After the 
hearing the board evaluates the environmental 
impacts related to the construction and operation 
of the facility on:
• Statewide electrical capacity
• Ecology, air, ground and surface water, wildlife 
and habitat
• Public health and safety
• Cultural, historical and recreational resources
• Transportation, communication and utilities
• The cumulative impact of emissions on 
the local community in accordance with 
environmental justice regulations 81
If the siting board finds that the facility is a 
“beneficial addition to or substitute for” generation 
capacity, that its construction is in the public 
interest, that the environmental effects will be 
minimized and that it is in compliance with the 
law, the project will be approved. 82
The new Article X makes several important 
changes to the way that wind farm siting approval 
was conducted between 2003 and 2011.  First, the 
entire approval process for the environmental and 
health permits will take a maximum 22 months 
for approval (or 28 months if there are special 
conditions) as compared to up to five years for 
some of the projects mentioned in this paper. 
Second, prior to Article X local municipalities were 
given sole responsibility in determining whether 
the zoning regulations in their town could, or 
should accommodate wind generation facilities. 
Under the new Article X the siting board has the 
ability to override local laws if they are deemed 
“unjustifiably restrictive.”  Lastly, under Article X 
developers are required by law to pay certain fees 
into intervenor funds- those funds can be used by 
any party who applies as an “intervenor,” not just 
the local municipality. 
Although the new siting approval process is 
meant to streamline permitting, wind developers 
are wary of its effectiveness.    There is concern 
over the costs associated with Article X, the level 
of structured public involvement demanded, who 
receives the intervenor funds and the general 
rigidity of Article X’s structure.  
In S’s opinion: 
“To some extent the benefit [of Article X] 
is that there should be a little more of 
a consistent approach from one project 
to another.  You have one application 
administered at the state level and that 
may take some of the direct emotional 
pressure out of the equation.  But Article 
X did establish some higher levels of 
burden in terms of public outreach, which 
is something developers did before but 
maybe in the beginning they didn’t do as 
much public outreach because early on 
you don’t want to make a big splashy show 
of a project.  Now they lose the ability to 
time their public outreach the way they 
want.  They lose the ability to stay under 
the radar while making an assessment of 
the site and project feasibility.  And it also 
adds costs to make a PIP.
As for the intervenor funding, I’m fairly sure 
that every town’s costs for evaluating a 
project were reimbursed by the developer 
[under SEQR].  It became a bit of an open 
checkbook for the town, and as a developer 
you ended up paying for their consultants to 
do that or you would pay your consultants 
to do the study then their consultants to 
review it.  But it wasn’t necessarily the 
same as Article X intervenor funding- that 
fund is available to a wider array of people 
involved in the process, under SEQR it 
was strictly for the town in review of the 
permitting process.” 83
T’s concerns regarding Article X were also largely 
related to greater costs imposed by the new 
regulations:
“Before you could spend $2-10 million 
just to get the permits and engineering 
work done.  But with the new state 
regulations, Article X, it’s going to be way 
more expensive.  I’m very wary of the new 
process.  They are going to make way more 
demands and we are still going to have to 
get tax agreements with the town.  They 
think that they are smarter than business 
and can do it all at once but its not going 
to work out that way.  And, you know, Article 
X will be a political review as well.” 84
The rigidity of the new Article X process removes 
some of the freedoms developers had when 
their projects were reviewed under SEQR.  Under 
Article X the developer must make his intention to 
develop in a town public before he can do any site 
scoping or evaluate the town’s perception of wind 
generation.  This means the developer must spend 
more time and money developing a strong PIP that 
will prepare him to handle any public opposition, 
and questions regarding his development when 
his knowledge of the existing conditions is weak. 
There is also concern regarding the intervenor 
funding because any entity that is approved by 
the board can become an intervenor and receive 
funding.  This includes community groups that 
might oppose the development, so in essence the 
developer could be funding his opposition.  
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There is also concern that Article X will make 
the approval process even more expensive 
and require greater amounts of capital prior to 
entering into any sort of tangible development 
agreements.  The shortened procedure time 
means that developers have to have all financing 
for pre-construction expenses up front, rather 
than gathering the funding throughout a 
lengthier approval process.  Second, the costs laid 
out in the Article X procedures solely reflect the 
cost of reviewing applications by the state, not 
the cost of conducting the studies necessary for 
submission to the Article X Board.  Unlike SEQR,’s 
list of required study elements the scope of the 
analysis for under Article X is determined by the 
Board.   Thus there is room for subjectivity and 
debate if the demands that the Board makes are 
seen as excessive by developers.
Additionally, Article X has the potential to fuel 
local opposition to any new electric facility 
simply because it overrides the power of the local 
communities in the decision making process. 
Even if a town has declared a moratorium against 
wind power in their district, the Siting Board can 
overrule their decision.  This lack of control can 
drive even harsher reactions to the development 
than developers under SEQR.  It can also make 
the developer’s negotiations for lease agreements 
and payments in lieu of taxes to the town more 
difficult and expensive.
State agencies in New York have made a forceful 
effort to streamline the permitting and approval 
processes for siting and connecting electric 
generation facilities in New York.  To this end 
they have greatly enhanced the State’s role/
control over the process.  The State believes 
that these changes will make the permitting and 
interconnection processes easier for developers 
and will speed up the number of new renewable 
generation facilities coming online.   However, 
while the streamlining of these processes might 
provide some relief to developers in terms of 
continuity, they also make the development 
process less flexible and require developers 
to front greater amounts of money with little 
certainty over whether their projects will actually 
receive approval or a contract with NYSERDA to 
sell their attributes.  In contrast, longer timelines 
are actually beneficial to developers because they 
spread costs over time.  Longer timelines also 
alow develoeprs to explore a project’s feasability 
without committing large sums of money upfront. 
The cost of this greater risk and uncertainty will 
be reflected in the bid price of RECs and make 
the development of renewable energy even more 
expensive to ratepayers in New York.
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to enhance the attractiveness of New 
York to renewable energy development New 
York must prove its commitment to renewable 
energy and focus on mitigating the uncertainties 
of development.  Right now the process is highly 
centralized and gives the state a vast amount 
of power in determining the fate of projects. 
While this streamlining of the process may 
make demands on developers more consistent, it 
decreases the opportunity for different agencies 
and levels of government to voice approval for 
projects.  It also creates greater risk for developers 
because there is less room for negotiation of 
development demands and puts a higher burden 
of cost on the developer, without offering greater 
certainty.
The central procurement model used by NYSERDA 
to award bid contracts limits the amount of 
development in the state.  Without a NYSERDA 
contract a wind project is not financially feasible 
because there is no alternative REC market, 
other than the voluntary market.  If there were 
more options for selling RECs in the New York 
the amount of development could be larger. 
Additionally, when the NYSERDA contracts end 
the State anticipates that the voluntary market 
will absorb the additional RECs coming into the 
marketplace.  Considering that there is virtually 
no market flexibility right now and only 1% of 
RECs are sold in the voluntary market, it seems 
unlikely that the voluntary market will grow 
enough to satisfy the amount of future supply. 
The uncertainty of New York’s REC market creates 
a disincentive for developers who have the option 
of building projects in states where compliance 
mandates are indefinite and there is long-term 
potential for selling RECs.
From the State’s perspective the 10-year 
NYSERDA contracts provide enough financial 
support for facilities to come online, and after 
recuperating those sunk costs the state should 
not be responsible for further financial support 
to renewable energy.  However, this model is not 
ideal for sustainable development of renewable 
energy in the state.  The State ends up paying 
more upfront, and if NYSERDA contracts only 
cover the cost of development, as the state has 
intended, the profits from selling electricity may 
not provide enough financial gain for developers 
to further invest in expansion of wind in the 
future.  Additionally, there is no plan in place for 
the future of the RPS after 2015.  If the RPS is not 
continued or expanded there will be no demand 
market for renewables in New York after the 
program terminates.  Wind farms have a lifespan 
of 15-25 years.  After these wind farms expire, if 
no new RPS is implemented and developers have 
not gained enough financially to revitalize them, 
New York will return to its pre-RPS state in terms 
of renewable capacity.
The recent shifts in the approval processes for 
environmental permits and interconnection 
also create barriers for developers because they 
limit flexibility and increase the burden of cost 
to developers.  In order for developers to get the 
environmental permits necessary for development 
they must now assemble capital at the beginning 
of the development process and expose their 
projects to public criticism in the very early 
stages of development.  These changes have not 
given developers any greater certainty that their 
projects will obtain approval.  Furthermore, the 
centralization of the permit approval process 
creates greater possibility for decision-makers to 
be influenced by political forces.  Track records 
and past proven successes weigh heavily in the 
distribution of permit approvals, whether or 
not they are written in the standards used by 
regulatory agencies to allocate permits.  This 
bias makes it more difficult for new companies 
to get into the New York market and centralizing 
the governance process limits the number of 
opposing or unbiased voices participating in the 
approval process.  
In order for New York to create a sustainable 
renewable energy market and maintain the 
capacity it has added over the past 9 years, and 
work towards its full 52% potential, the state needs 
to show greater commitment to the industry and 
provide greater flexibility to developers.  New York 
can look to other states that for guidance on this 
issue.  For example, Texas surpassed its RPS target 
of 10,000 MW of renewable electricity by 2025 
in 2009.  The state currently has 12,212 MW of 
installed wind generation.  Part of Texas’ success 
stems from the fact that utilities are required to 
purchase RECs and receive the burden of cost for 
grid expansion to facilitate renewable generation. 
By taking the cost of interconnection away from 
the developer, development in the state is much 
cheaper.  California also has a very aggressive 
RPS- 33% by 2020.  Thus far the State has added 
5,549 MW of wind capacity. California’s RPS 
allows REC trading within the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council’s jurisdiction, but caps the 
amount of traded RECs that can be used to meet 
the State’s compliance mandate.  This creates a 
greater market for wind developers to sell their 
RECs than New York’s central procurement model. 
Furthermore, even after the State’s RPS targets 
are met, California is required to maintain 33% 
of generation from renewables indefinitely.  This 
is key for wind developers, because it gives them 
assurance than there will always be a purchaser 
of their electricity.
New York State must extend its RPS so that 
at minimum, a market for renewable energy 
will continue to exist, although by extending 
renewable capacity targets the state can further 
grow the industry.  If the State decides to extend 
the RPS but abandon the central procurement 
model, it should encourage long-term power 
33
Barriers to Utility-Scale Wind Development in New York State
32
purchasing agreements between utilities and 
renewable electricity generators.  Long-term 
contracts provide greater stability for developers 
and make securing investment in renewable 
energy projects easier for developers.  It will also 
facilitate new players entering the market and 
a greater diversity in pricing options for these 
contracts, ultimately reducing costs to ratepayers. 
Additionally the State needs to recognize that 
heavy cost-burdens and strict development 
guidelines suppress the ability of developers to 
comply with the State’s requirements.  Although 
relieving some of this burden means that the state 
would have to absorb some risk, the rewards that 
the State could access in terms of added capacity 
would be great.
To grow its renewable capacity New York must 
consider the implications of its highly centralized 
approval process for electric generating facilities 
and whether it is truly committed to exploiting 
its renewable resources.  Right now the state has 
taken some efforts to grow the industry but seems 
hesitant to truly commit.  Further contemplation 
of what New York really wants and needs will help 
the State decide its attitude towards renewable 
energy and how policies can be designed that 
satisfy the State’s goals while meeting the needs 
of renewable energy developers.   
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